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Abstract:
Over the last century within the philosophy of mind, the intersubjective model of
self has gained traction as a viable alternative to the oft-criticised Cartesian
solipsistic paradigm. These two models are presented as incompatible inasmuch as
Cartesians perceive other minds as “a problem” for the self, while intersubjectivists
insist that sociality is foundational to selfhood. This essay uses the Paranormal
Activity series (2007–2015) to explore this philosophical debate. It is argued
that these films simultaneously evoke Cartesian premises (via found-footage
camerawork), and intersubjectivity (via an ongoing narrative structure that
emphasises connections between the characters, and between each film). The
philosophical debates illuminate premises on which the series ’ story and horror
depends. Moreover, Paranormal Activity also sheds light on the theoretical debate:
the series brings those two paradigms together into a coherent whole, thereby
suggesting that the two models are potentially compatible. By developing a
combined model, scholars working in the philosophy of mind might better account
for the different aspects of self-experience these paradigms focus on.
Keywords: Intersubjectivity, Descartes, Paranormal Activity, Horror, Self
As numerous scholars have observed, the Cartesian tradition is so “central
to Western philosophy” (Rozemond, 1998, p. xi) that “it is hard to think
of any subsequent [Western] philosophical system…that does not
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prominently engage with some version of ‘Cartesian ’ dualism” (Nelson,
2014, p. 277; see also Grosz, 1994, p. 9). The foundational nature of
Rene Descartes ’ work is evident within the philosophy of mind; major
textbooks on the subject routinely devote initial chapters to Cartesianism,
for instance, foregrounding Descartes ’ influence on subsequent thought
(see Carruthers, 2004; Cockburn, 2001; Crane, 2001; Lowe, 2004; Maslin,
2001; McGinn, 1999).1 It seems that “the Cartesian perspective is
unavoidable” in the philosophy of mind (Robinson, 2014), both in the
sense of its historical importance, and also insofar as “philosophy today
continues to be controlled by Cartesian scepticism” or attempts to usurp
the Cartesian model (Bauer, 2005, p. 50).
Perhaps most surprising is that Cartesianism has remained so
prominent within the philosophy of mind despite the criticism aimed
at Cartesian postulates. Since its publication, Meditations (1641) has been
challenged on the basis of Descartes ’ methods, the progression of his logic,
and his conclusions (see, for example, Husserl, 1960[1931]; Nietzsche,
1997[1886], p. 38; Williams, 2015[1978]). Subsequently, Cartesian
thinking has been criticised for adhering to Descartes ’ solipsistic
paradigm. Within the philosophy of mind, the latest major incarnation
of such criticism is an attack on the Cartesian premise that selves exist
independently of others, which is contrasted with an intersubjective
paradigm. This challenge has been mounting since the early 20th Century,
taking its lead from, for instance, Wittgenstein’s rejection of Cartesian
solipsism in favour of self-other interaction (language use), which
Wittgenstein saw as being fundamental to selfhood (see Avramides,
2001, p. 214). The intersubjective outlook is a particularly significant
challenge to Cartesian thinking, because it accounts for a crucial aspect of
human existence that Descartes eschews: sociality. Descartes works from
the assumption that each person is discrete, and that each individual has
immediate, intimate access to themselves in ways that others do not.2
1. Descartes is typically pegged as the starting point for “philosophical, as opposed to
theological, solutions to the mind-body problem” (Uttal, 2004, p. 202), and as such
Cartesian thinking has become a cornerstone of philosophy of mind in the largely
secular age. To clarify, “Cartesian” refers to scholarship that follows from and concords
with premises established in Descartes ’ work (on this distinction, see Baker and Morris,
2002).
2. Descartes does not refer to “ the self ” but rather to “ the mind,” but he equates
“ the mind” with the essence of selfhood (that which one refers to when using the
first-person). As Robert Solomon notes, “ the self, the soul, and the mind” are “ three
different names for the same thing” in Descartes ’ work (2002, p. 127), and there is
widespread agreement on this interpretation in the field (for example, see Atkins,
2008, p. 16; Pauen, 2011, p. 85; Rozemond, 1998, p. xiii; Shoemaker, 2003, p. 146;
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Descartes presumes that there is a self to examine, proclaiming “I am;
I exist: this is certain” (1998[1641], p. 65). He posits that the self is a
coherent, discrete entity that can be studied in isolation. One implication
that follows from this conception is that other selves – themselves
independent entities – would muddy one’s investigation into selfhood.
Although his approach is straightforward and intuitively appealing,
Descartes ’ proclamation that “I manifestly know that nothing can be
perceived more easily and more evidently than my own mind” (1998,
p. 69), while “all external things” may be “nothing but…bedeviling
hoaxes” (1998, p. 62) leads to one of two conclusions: a) my thoughts
prove that I exist, but I have no such evidence to confirm the existence of
anything outside of myself (epistemological solipsism); b) the exterior
world (including all objects, matter and people) only exists as
representations in my consciousness (metaphysical solipsism). The latter
has become particularly significant for thinkers in the Cartesian tradition,
because Descartes ’ “philosophical work bequeaths [a] problem to us” that
he did not concern himself with: the problem of “other-minds”
(Avramides, 2001, p. 21). If introspective self-access is all one can be
certain of, one cannot definitively ascertain whether other people exist or
have minds.
This problem – and the egoistic solipsism it entails – is embedded in
Cartesianism (see Overgaard, 2007, pp. 1–2), yet it appears to be at odds
with humanity’s inherently social nature. Thus, Cartesian solipsism has
fallen out of favour over the last century,3 and the intersubjective
paradigm has flourished, precisely because – in contrast to the bounded,
independently-existing Cartesian self – the intersubjective model
prioritises the self’s entanglement with other persons (see Leonardelli
and Toh, 2015; Slotter, Winger and Soto, 2015, p. 15). That is, other
minds are encompassed as an “intrinsic […] intimately intertwined […]
basic” aspect of selfhood within the intersubjective model, rather than
being separate or problematic (Hermans, 2015: 277; see also Josselson and
Hopkins, 2015, p. 225).
On this basis, the intersubjective paradigm is typically presented in
opposition to Cartesianism. For example, Taipale (2015) argues that
Cartesianism has standardised a flawed conception of human interaction.
Rather than assuming that embodiment hinders one’s ability to directly
Vicari, 2008, p. 140). Following this established convention, and for the sake of
efficiency, I use “self ” to capture the essential quality Descartes refers to when using
“mind”, “ soul”, or “ spirit ”.
3. On this decline of Cartesianism and rise of socially focused, anti-egoistic theories in
philosophy of mind, see Zahavi, 2005, p. 100.
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access others ’ minds, Taipale argues that bodies directly express mental
states to others (p. 167; see also Zahavi, 2015, pp. 149–150). Others are
blunter in their opposition to Cartesianism. For example, Ventriglio and
Bhugra (2015, p. 369) refer to Cartesianism as a “dogma” that should be
overcome (see also Guta, 2015, p. 10). Since the intersubjective model has
been proffered as “an anti-Cartesian conception of mental phenomena”
(Roy, 2015, p. 90), its adoption as a normative paradigm within the
philosophy of mind is implied to be a usurpation of Cartesianism.
However, it is unclear whether the intersubjective paradigm can
vanquish Cartesianism entirely. As Walker (2014, p. 171) observes,
Cartesian postulates “have been repeatedly battered down since
[Descartes ’] own day, only to rise up again.” In spite of its flaws, the
Cartesian conception of selfhood has proven to be remarkably resilient, to
the extent that although “scarcely anyone” working within contemporary
philosophy of mind considers premises such as Cartesian mind-body
dualism to be a “live possibility […] considerable effort continues to be
spent on the construction, consideration, analysis and refutation of”
Cartesianism (Shoemaker, 2003, p. 287; see also Thompson, 2008, p. 99).
Indeed, challenging Cartesianism means overcoming notions that are so
deeply entrenched in prevailing conceptualisations of selfhood (see
Leudar and Costall, 2004, p. 602) that some attempts to debunk
Cartesian thinking inadvertently rest on Cartesian preconceptions. To
illustrate: despite trying to design a “non-Cartesian” model, Colman
admits he “found [him]self […] impl[ying] precisely the kind of Cartesian
dualism [he] was attempting to overcome” (2015, pp. 316–7). This
mistake has been observed in numerous attempts to disparage
Cartesianism (see Cutler and MacKenzie, 2011, p. 63; LaVine and
Tissaw, 2015, p. 32; Rockwell, 2005, p. xi).
Yet, it is difficult to assess whether intersubjectivity is sufficient to
usurp Cartesianism as the philosophy of mind’s standard paradigm by
looking solely at the philosophical literature. The debate is comprised of
arguments in favour of the proponent’s particular position, and those
positions are polarised. Thus, in order to compare these two theoretical
stances, this article will employ a cinematic case study that represents key
qualities of both models: the Paranormal Activity series (2007–2015).4
The analysis will demonstrate that although the intersubjective model
4. The series is comprised of six films: Paranormal Activity (Oren Peli, 2007), Paranormal
Activity 2 (Tod Williams, 2010), Paranormal Activity 3 (Henry Joost and Ariel
Schulman, 2011), Paranormal Activity 4 (Henry Joost and Ariel Schulman, 2012),
Paranormal Activity: The Marked Ones (Christopher Landon, 2014), and Paranormal
Activity: The Ghost Dimension (Gregory Plotkin, 2015).
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accounts for the social aspects of selfhood and thereby counters
solipsism’s primary flaw, the Cartesian model still captures essential
qualities of selfhood. Both are evident within and are integral to the way
Paranormal Activity tells its ongoing story and scares its audience.
Found-Footage Horror and Selfhood
Narrative films frequently dwell on themes that are pertinent to selfhood,
including self-other relations. This is most notably true of the horror
genre where selfhood is something of a thematic preoccupation (see Jones,
2011), as is evidenced by various genre stalwarts; for example, Psycho
(Alfred Hitchcock, 1960) is concerned with the terror of identity fracture
(Norman Bates internalises and “becomes” the persona of his dead
mother); in The Exorcist (William Friedkin, 1973), fear stems from
demonic possession of a human body; isolation from others causes
The Shining’s (Stanley Kubrick, 1980) lead protagonist to threaten his
loved ones; bodies evacuated of selfhood provide the horror of zombie
films such as Dawn of the Dead (George Romero, 1978), and so forth.
The Paranormal Activity series is part of this rich lineage within the
horror genre.
Some of the concerns raised by Paranormal Activity are particular to the
subgenre the series belongs to; the found-footage film.5 Found-footage
films consist of material shot by the film’s characters. Thus, the cameras
recording the footage are present within the diegetic space. In contrast to
the invisible, omnipresent, extra-diegetic cameras that typify cinematic
storytelling, found-footage’s cameras are either mounted in position or
have to be manually relocated by the protagonists in order to record the
footage. Found-footage’s immediate affinities with the Cartesian approach
are apparent. Cartesian philosophy of mind is concerned with limited
perspectives on and access to the world, based in a selfhood that is,
as Grosz contends, “removed from direct contact with other minds and a
sociocultural community.” Thus, the solipsistic self accesses others and
the world in an indirect “mediated” fashion (1994, p. 7). Found-footage
echoes this Cartesian mode of perception insofar as the audience’s access
to narrative events, characters and environments are explicitly mediated;
they are captured only via the characters ’ camcorders.
For Cartesian thinkers, embodiment prohibits communion with other
selves and limits one’s access to the world. In found-footage film – as the
analysis of Paranormal Activity will demonstrate – the camera frame
5. On the influence of found-footage horror, see Blake & Aldana Reyes, 2016;
Heller-Nicholas, 2014.
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operates in much the same way: the horror commonly derives from what
is excluded from the visual frame (off-camera events). In Paranormal
Activity, the characters ’ attempts to record the eponymous “activity” are
routinely thwarted by perspectival limitation. For example, a staple of the
series is that a noise occurs off-screen, and although a character turns the
camera to spot the source, she or he fails to do so. The footage itself is
crucial in allowing protagonists to evince the demon’s presence (and the
threat it poses) to other characters, even though the demon itself is not
directly displayed until the final film’s climax. Before that moment, its
presence has to be inferred from cues such as furniture being moved.
Supernaturally-themed found-footage is a ve´rite´ style that is ostensibly
frightening because it feigns access to “reality,” and so suggests that
ghosts and demons are real. In practice however, such films are mainly
frightening because of their perspectival limitations. Thus, for the viewer,
found-footage’s “frame-problem” is caused by mediated access to the
narrative world: either the camera-wielder provides insufficient access to
the events (failing to show the threat), or technology fails to alert
protagonists to threats that are caught on camera (and so are apparent to
the viewer). The lack of an omniscient narrator highlights that humans are
vulnerable to threats that are incomprehensible from a limited first-person
perspective.
The Paranormal Activity series has been selected because it is a
particularly notable presence within the subgenre and within
contemporary horror more broadly. The series ’ unadjusted, worldwide
theatrical gross is over $889m at the time of writing (Boxofficemojo.com).
The series has also spawned an unofficial Japanese sequel Paranormal
Activity 2: Tokyo Night (Paranoˆmaru akutibiti: Dai-2-shoˆ, Toshikazu Nagae,
2010), a variety of imitators,6 and numerous parodies.7 The series is
representative of the found-footage subgenre inasmuch as the traits
described above belong to the majority of found-footage films. However,
the series is also unique in several ways that make it especially apt for
study. First, it is the longest running found-footage series (comprising
of six entries). Second, unlike the three Blair Witch Project films
6. The most obviously influenced are those that riff on Paranormal Activity’s title; these
include Paranormal Asylum (Nimrod Zalmanowitz, 2013), Paranormal Captivity (John
Orrichio, 2012), Paranormal Demons (David Bru¨ckner, 2015), Paranormal Entity (Shane
Van Dyke, 2009), Paranormal Incident (Matthew Bolton, 2012), Paranormal Vitality
(Xavier Berraondo, 2012), and Paranormal Xperience 3D (Sergi Vizcaino, 2011).
7. These include Abnormal Activity (Jason Gerbay, 2010), Paranormal Activity: A Hardcore
Parody (Hef Pounder, 2012), Paranormal Movie (Kevin Farley, 2013), Paranormal
Parody (C.J. Goodman, 2011), and Paranormal Whacktivity (Roger Roth, 2013).
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(1999–2016) or the four-part [Rec] series (2007–2014), Paranormal
Activity sustains its found-footage ethos across all six films. This
combination has a significant impact on the series. Although the films
utilise the restricted camerawork that is characteristic of the found-footage
subgenre, the saga is constituted by numerous (limited) perspectives in
combination. In isolation, each film could be interpreted as being about
one demon targeting a particular individual within a single family.
However, as the series progresses the incidents are imbricated,
highlighting the interconnections between protagonists who initially
appear to be discrete, but whose lives and fates are revealed to be mutually
constitutive. Without those deeper connections, the isolated paranormal
incidents are inexplicable; it is only by coming to understand their
relationships with other characters that the individual protagonists
comprehend what is happening to them. That is, one isolated
perspective cannot sufficiently convey the story. In this regard, the
series leans towards an intersubjective approach; meaning is not found in
one viewpoint or even one film, but in the coalescence of multiple
perspectives. Although the demon’s conduct provides the scares in each
film, the series ’ overarching horror derives from the characters ’ shared
story; from a rolling plot oriented around the sacrifice of a first-born male
(Hunter), which drives the demon and dooms the protagonists.
Intersubjectivity – the characters ’ links with one another, which are
revealed across the series – is a predominant source of dread.
As the series progresses, those anxieties mount precisely because the
narrative world expands outwards. The first film is set in one location.
This choice is indicative of the film’s small-scale production (the film was
shot on a $15,000 budget). In his director’s commentary for the 2010 Icon
Film DVD release of Paranormal Activity, Oren Peli refers to the possibility
of the protagonists leaving their home and the demon following them, but
reveals that he discarded the idea because it would complicate the shoot.
In the final film – a much larger production with a $10m budget – the
characters are less restricted; they leave their home in precisely the way
Peli envisaged. Beyond the second film each movie encompasses various
locations, most notably in the fifth entry (Paranormal Activity: The Marked
Ones), which is not principally based around a single family home. As the
narrative spaces become larger in each film, and the number of locations
increase cumulatively across the series, greater emphasis is placed on the
connections between these discrete spaces and the growing cast of
characters who inhabit them.
In sum, the Paranormal Activity series ’ found-footage mode captures
ways of thinking about perception that philosophers of mind would refer
to as being Cartesian. Since these traits arise out of the films’ formal
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properties, they are intrinsic to the series. What makes Paranormal Activity
unique among its found-footage brethren however, is its structure as an
unfolding narrative; this integral aspect of the series evokes the
intersubjective paradigm by emphasising that meaning is contingent
on the links between people (even when the characters are unaware of
the connections that bind them). Thus, the series figuratively evokes
two competing understandings of self – as independent and as
intersubjective – and so it offers a case study via which to compare the
two models.
This is not to posit that the filmmakers intentionally embedded the
philosophical comparison in Paranormal Activity, but rather that these
competing conceptions are also integral to the way Paranormal Activity
tells its ongoing story. In finding the films frightening, and in
understanding the significance of events relative to the ongoing plot,
viewers inherently engage with the same concerns that the intersubjective
and Cartesian models hinge on. The combination of film and philosophy
illuminates meaning; the philosophical debates cast the Paranormal
Activity series in a particular light, and vice versa. Furthermore, while
philosophical debate in this area is polarised, arguing for or against a
Cartesian or intersubjective paradigm, the films evoke both models
simultaneously, without imposing an argumentative agenda. As such, the
series admits that both conceptions of selfhood are valuable, rather than
positing that the two are mutually exclusive.
Cartesianism and Intersubjectivity in Paranormal Activity
As is characteristic of the subgenre’s form, the found-footage that
constitutes Paranormal Activity is shot by the characters or is
documented via cameras that the characters set up. As such, the
narrative universe is constituted by the characters ’ highly limited
perspectives. This overarching ethos is Cartesian in character.
Frequently, shots are directly aligned with a character’s first-person
viewpoint (the camera captures what is in her or his field of vision). Even
when this is not the case, the camera’s inability to record from more than
one position is redolent of the Cartesian frame-problem; the notion that
the world can only be perceived from one (first-person) perspective,
because humans are limited by their bodies. Using an alternative viewing
apparatus (a camera) may extend one’s perspectival range, but the
camera’s perspective is also limited since it more or less replicates the eye’s
restricted field of vision.
Moreover, the films replicate anxieties that are denoted by the term
“frame problem” because the series ’ scares frequently arise out of
that perspectival limitation (the restricted frame is a “problem”).
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For example, in Paranormal Activity 3, Lisa (the protagonists ’ babysitter)
uses the camera’s limited field to play a prank. Dennis (step-father to
the central family) sets-up a surveillance camcorder that pans across
their kitchen and living room. Lisa hides off-screen and jumps into
frame shouting “Boo! Hi, Dennis,” so as to scare him when he reviews the
footage.8 From the audience’s perspective (aligned with Dennis ’,
reviewing the tapes after-the-fact), the scare arises from Lisa’s sudden
appearance, which is unexpected because she hides just beyond the
frame’s periphery. This incident establishes that Dennis ’ surveillance is of
limited efficacy, inasmuch as the camera can only record the area
immediately in front of it. Although the camera is set up to monitor the
room, emphasis is placed on what cannot be seen at any given moment.
On the third pan, Lisa is depicted sitting at the dining table. Moments
later, the fifth pan reveals that an anthropomorphic figure under a sheet
has appeared behind Lisa. The sheet then drops to the ground (the figure-
shape vanishes). Lisa does not see the event (even though the audience,
and later Dennis, do) because it happens behind her. In this instance,
Lisa’s limited viewpoint is a source of terror: her body prevents her from
perceiving the demon’s presence. These limitations are fundamental to
Paranormal Activity’s horror, both because the audience access the events
in the same way the characters mainly do (via the footage), and also
because of dramatic irony; the cameras reveal threats of which the
characters are not immediately cognisant. In Paranormal Activity,
audio-visual information correlates with knowledge: the characters (and
audience) come to understand and evidence what is happening by
apprehending incidents on film.
Although the films include an iteration of the frame-problem, the series
does not straightforwardly adhere to a Cartesian conception of
independent, isolated subjectivities. The found-footage aesthetic might
appear to mimic the first-person perspective, but the form does not offer
direct experiential access, even when a single protagonist holds a camera
to their eye-line. Only audio-visual data are presented. The footage cannot
convey other sensory data, the protagonists ’ inner-thoughts or
phenomenological experiences directly; the audience must infer emotion
via verbal and physical cues, for instance. Moreover, individual cameras
are not exclusively aligned with a single character’s first-person
8. Lisa’s call to Dennis elucidates an important function of the surveillance cameras that
are found throughout the series. Although they are perhaps impartial insofar as they are
not directly handled by characters, they do not constitute an omniscient viewpoint.
Security cameras extend the characters ’ ability to record footage (usually while
sleeping), acting as proxies for the characters who set-up and/or review the footage.
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perspective. For example, early in Paranormal Activity 2, Ali films her
family by the pool, then hands the camera to her boyfriend Brad, who
subsequently films Ali. Any one camera can stand-in for multiple
perspectives. This kind of perspective-switching is commonplace in the
series, so although the perspectives are limited, the frame does not exclude
others (in a Cartesian sense). This is particularly apparent where
characters review surveillance footage in pairs, for example; in such
cases, the footage constitutes a shared perspective on the events. As the
series progresses, more individuals and more cameras are involved:
altogether, at least twenty one cameras (including security cameras and
webcams) are used to film the series ’ footage, and these are operated
(in various combinations) by at least twenty four individuals.9 The series
is undergirded by a plural, intersubjective ethos, the scale of which
sets the Paranormal Activity series apart from other found-footage films.
The number of perspectives multiplies with each sequel, and each new
perspective contributes to the formation of ongoing narrative meaning.
Contra Goodenough (2005, pp. 23–24), who argues that “in the
philosophical film [… w]e inhabit solipsism. Each member of the
audience finds themselves located in the inexplicable space of the narrator
X,” Paranormal Activity offers no omniscient “narrator” viewpoint; it is
never revealed who is editing the footage (or for what purpose). Instead
the series merges solipsism with intersubjectivity. The technology is
solipsistic in that it is exclusionary. The cameras can only record footage,
the monitors can only exude information. Neither technology can interact
with the characters. However, the footage is a conduit for intersubjectivity
inasmuch as the characters use their recordings to come to terms with
their shared experiences. Moreover, the audience is invited to join in that
interpretive activity in order to work out what is happening to the
characters.
While each individual film seems to focus on a single family and the
demon mainly directs its attention towards one particular protagonist,
the series as a whole emphasises the connections between those families.
For instance, in Paranormal Activity: The Ghost Dimension, which is set
in 2013, Ryan views tapes of Kristi (one of Paranormal Activity
2’s protagonists) filmed when she was a child (around 1988). When
Ryan’s daughter Leila sneezes, Kristi responds “Bless you,” even though
the tape was filmed over 20 years earlier. The footage is bounded by the
9. These numbers are tentative (hence, “at least ”) because it is unclear precisely who films
and how many cameras capture The Ghost Dimension’s historical footage of Kristi and
Katie.
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edges of Ryan’s monitor, which implies that the incidents should be
mutually exclusive; in practice however, the separation is illusory.
The individual episodes and their respective characters are enmeshed in
fundamental ways, even if those interconnections are not always obvious
to the protagonists. This is most evident in Paranormal Activity: The
Marked Ones, which initially appears to be unrelated to the series ’
overarching storyline. However, as the film progresses, the connections
become apparent; most notably, lead protagonist Jesse finds pictures of his
pregnant mother stood with Lois, the leader of the “midwives” cult who
are responsible for the series ’ running plot (the attempt to incarnate a
demon via ritual sacrifice). Jesse thus discovers that he was involved with
the cult prior to his birth. This connection is not incidental; it is a key
plot-point that enables the protagonists to comprehend what is happening
to Jesse. Moreover, the film’s climax explicitly intersects with the
conclusion of the first Paranormal Activity: the last surviving protagonist
Hector is supernaturally transported to the house in which the first movie
is set, and witnesses the murder of Micah (which occurs off-screen in the
first film). From an audience perspective, The Marked Ones ’ ending would
be bewildering without knowledge of the first film. This sequence also
retroactively shapes the audience’s understanding of the first film’s climax.
In Paranormal Activity, Katie screams for Micah, but those cries emanate
from off-screen: she is downstairs, while the camera is fixed on a tripod in
the upstairs bedroom. In The Marked Ones it is revealed that Katie screams
at Hector, who has mysteriously appeared in her house. Thus, despite
being referred to as a “spin-off” rather than a canonical part of the series
(see Barker, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2014), The Marked Ones shares an
intersubjective, mutually constitutive connection with its antecedent.
This trait of requiring the audience to reconsider events in light of
subsequent iterations is repeated across the series. In Paranormal Activity
2, for example, the family’s household is trashed in what looks like a
burglary, yet, as Ali notes, “They didn’t take anything.” The audience is
led to believe that the mess is caused by the demon rather than thieves,
and that the family have not yet understood that they are being stalked by
a paranormal entity. However, in Paranormal Activity 3, the footage is
expanded to reveal that “the only thing […] really missing” is a “box of
[video]tapes that Katie brought” into their house. Thus, a different set of
motives and implications are raised: the mess was caused by burglars
rather than the demon, and so emphasis is placed on the thieves ’ motives
(why they might want the tapes). When the same box of videos is found in
both The Marked Ones and The Ghost Dimension, the tapes seem even more
significant and the mystery of their relocation deepens. After establishing
that the tapes exist, Paranormal Activity 3 is comprised of footage from
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some of those tapes. Furthermore, Paranormal Activity 2 and 3 flesh
out the events leading up to the first film, and as such, the first film’s
proceedings are re-characterised as being not just unfortunate but
inevitable. Taken as separate, independent entities, selves appear to be
significant in a particular way. When viewed as part of a larger whole – as
with the relationship between each film and the series – the entity signifies
in different ways, and must be reconceived accordingly.
The series ’ overarching plotline foregrounds interconnection,
characterising it in two ways. First, Paranormal Activity suggests that
intersubjectivity is fundamental to selfhood. With the exception of The
Marked Ones (which is based around an apartment complex), each film
mainly takes place in and around a family home. The initial stages of each
film exhibit the characters engaging in family and friendship-oriented
social activities. For instance, Paranormal Activity 2 opens with Katie
welcoming her sister (Kristi), brother-in-law (Daniel) and new-born
nephew (Hunter) home from hospital. The series ’ overarching plot is
fixated on Hunter’s bloodline: Hunter is the first-born male in several
generations, and as such he is required as a sacrifice for Lois ’ (his great-
grandmother’s) “bargain with a demon.” The latter is indicative of the
second way the series characterises interconnection: as terrifying. The
tone of Paranormal Activity is shaped by its genre, and the connections
that bring the series ’ protagonists together also doom them. The vast
majority of characters are killed by the demon or by individuals who are
under its influence. The characters are endangered by their involvement
with Hunter, his blood-relatives, or the cult of “midwives” who are led by
Lois. However, this is not a criticism of intersubjectivity per se. As a
horror film series, Paranormal Activity’s raison d’eˆtre is to engender fear.
By using interconnection to generate horror, the series embeds
intersubjectivity into its very fabric.
Although intersubjectivity is inevitable for the series ’ characters,
Cartesian premises are also deeply ingrained into the series ’ modus
operandi. As I have already outlined, found-footage films typically draw
on restricted framing in order to generate fear, either by pivoting the
camera to reveal an unexpected presence in the camera-operator’s vicinity,
or by having an entity (human or otherwise) suddenly enter the frame
from off-screen. Both techniques are employed in order to startle the
audience, and both rely on the idea that humans are vulnerable to threats
because our perspective is limited. Form is used to generate jump-scares
that are impactful because they draw on what philosophers of mind would
refer to as Cartesian premises. Simultaneously, the unfolding narrative is
infused with a sense of dread that is rooted in what philosophers of mind
would call intersubjective concerns.
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A Combined Paradigm
Although some scholars within the philosophy of mind have hailed the
intersubjective paradigm as a viable alternative to Cartesianism, there is
reason to be sceptical that it will render the Cartesian model entirely
redundant. As my analysis of Paranormal Activity demonstrates, the
Cartesian concept elucidates aspects of selfhood that the intersubjective
model alone does not. Using the found-footage mode, Paranormal Activity
depicts the world as audio-visual data, which stand in for “reality.” As
Wartenberg (2007, p. 60) observes, one of the continuing appeals of
Descartes ’ work is that he raises doubts over the legitimacy of using senses
(rather than reason) as “accurate guides for determining the structure of
reality.” This is especially pertinent to the found-footage horror film,
which riffs upon the notion of distilling reality on film and discerning
what is real; the subgenre intentionally plays with conventions of
documentary realism in order to portray fictional (in this case,
supernatural) events as if they are plausible. As the Paranormal Activity
series progresses – as the budget increases, and as the films seek to offer
novel thrills to entice theatre-goers back into the cinema – the films place
greater emphasis on spectacle at the expense of realism. The series thus
tests the audience’s willingness to suspend disbelief.
Despite the apparent unreality of these films, they nevertheless attracted
an audience who were willing to pay for and be scared by contrived
supernatural incidents. The continuing appeal of the series and other such
found-footage films attests to how reliant we are on sensory – particularly
audio-visual – information as a source of knowledge, and how deeply
entrenched that reliance is. Indeed, as Descartes realised during his
meditations, negating “one’s customary ideas […] is not as easy […] as it
might seem” (Wartenberg, 2007, p. 60).
There is a parallel to draw between Descartes ’ realisation and the
Paranormal Activity films here. Just as Descartes ’ project in the Meditations
is to uncover the nature of reality using reason rather than sensory data,
the story of each film is that the characters eventually come to realise that
their former understanding of reality (derived from what they “see” and
“know”) is insufficient; it cannot account for the demon’s presence and
influence. Most of the characters fall back on their preconceptions, even
when those notions are challenged. In Paranormal Activity, for instance,
the demon blows Katie’s hair while Micah looks directly at her. It is
apparent that the demon is invisible (Micha cannot see the demon), yet
Micah nevertheless searches for it in adjoining rooms, as if the demon
would need to hide from him. Micah relies on his ontological
preconceptions in spite of contrary evidence, because he cannot
comprehend the alternative; his incomprehension is signalled by his
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repeated use of “what” questions during the sequence (“What the fuck
is that? […] What the hell? […] What are you talking about?”). Such
incomprehension is evident throughout the series; for example, in
Paranormal Activity 3, Dennis ’ assertion “there’s something there” and
his question “what does it want?” are also indicative of the characters ’
struggle to understand what the demon is because it challenges their
presumptions about existence and the forms beings can take.
Although the series ’ characters stubbornly cling to their preconceptions
when challenged, they eventually come to realise their folly. In Paranormal
Activity 2, for example, it takes the majority of the film’s run-time for Ali to
persuade her sceptical father (Daniel) that they are subject to a demonic
visitation. It is not simply the videos that sway him; Daniel is persuaded by
Ali, who uses the footage as a means to an end. Daniel reacts to his
revelation by turning to others for advice, enlisting his spiritually-minded
ex-housekeeper Martine to help banish the demon. For Descartes,
“self-deception is a very productive tool in the struggle against false
certainties, since it expands our ability to free ourselves from our
own convictions” (Frogel, 2016, p. 94), but in Paranormal Activity,
false certainties are not only defeated by rumination: they are overturned
via communion and consensus with others. By relinquishing his
preconceptions about the fundamental nature of existence, Daniel
attains an understanding of what is happening to him, yet that also
entails realising that he is reliant on others (here, Ali and Martine). The
same is true of the audience’s understanding of the series, which is
facilitated by taking in the series as a whole – adapting one’s
understanding based on subsequent facts as they are revealed – rather
than contemplating each film in isolation. The latter is akin to a Cartesian
view (ruminating on the individual self in isolation), and the former is an
intersubjective ethos (comprehending the individual via its relations with
others).
This is not to suggest that one view should be abandoned by adopting a
seemingly antithetical position. Indeed, the story Paranormal Activity
weaves over the course of six films is that no single definitive
interpretation is available: rather, the audience is required to
continually negotiate and reinterpret events as the series progresses.
Even the final film (The Ghost Dimension) raises further unanswered
questions about the demon and the cult, despite its tagline promising that
“every secret will be revealed.” This lack of finality illuminates a crucial
aspect of the philosophical debate at hand: no model of self is final.
Ongoing debate will continue to be shaped by future contributions within
the discipline. This proclamation might seem to signal a victory for the
intersubjective model insofar as intersubjectivity a) envisions the self as
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complex and context-mutable; b) looks outwards towards the world and
others (rather than inwards towards oneself); and c) invites further
debate, implying that the theory will have to adapt according to future
contributions from a network of scholars. It might appear that the
opposite is true of Cartesian introspection inasmuch as the Cartesian
model presents the self as discrete, finite and locatable. However, the
Cartesian model is imbued with a spirit of scepticism – arising out
of Descartes ’ original project – that also eschews finality. As a
thought-experiment, Descartes imagines that his perceptions might be
produced by a demon intent on deceiving him, meaning that his most
fundamental presumptions about existence and sensory perception might
be false. Descartes ’ demon is the haunting presence of inquiry that cannot
be sated because it is sceptical inquiry personified. Paranormal Activity’s
demon embodies a similar ethos, not only because it causes the characters
to reconsider their preconceptions, but also because the appearance of the
demon in the final Paranormal Activity instalment inspires a similar level
of incredulity, leaving viewers uncertain as to the character’s fates, the
cult’s goals, and the demon’s desires. It also leaves the series open for
another possible sequel, since the demon is not eradicated.
The possibility that the demon (and the series) may return again
elucidates another parallel between Paranormal Activity and Descartes ’
proclamation about entrenched beliefs. The reason “long-standing
opinions” are so hard to forsake is because they “keep returning again
and again, almost against [one’s] will” (Descartes 1998, p. 62);
indefatigability implies that persistent ideas endure because they contain
some truth that refuses to be supressed. It is revealing that Descartes
struggled to escape the grip of seemingly irresistible ideas. This is
precisely the struggle that characterises contemporary anti-Cartesian
thinkers ’ attempts to exorcise Cartesianism from its dominant position in
the philosophy of mind. No matter how frequently Cartesianism is
challenged or rejected, it returns “again and again.”
One might argue that the resilience of Cartesian premises is the product
of habit, indicating how deeply entrenched those notions are, rather than
how accurate the model is. However, I contend that the reason
Cartesianism continues to maintain a prominent position in the field is
not only due to its historical significance. Rather, Cartesianism persists
because it articulates certain key aspects of selfhood. To reject
Cartesianism is to deny the impact that perspectival limitation has on
self-conception and to neglect the fundamentally private, internal nature
that characterises so much of our self-experience. Admitting those
premises does not invalidate intersubjectivity. As the textual analysis
illustrates, the intersubjective model underlines how crucial the social
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aspects of selfhood are. The Cartesian model, as I have established, fails to
account for sociality’s significant role in self-conception. Thus, neither
paradigm seems to offer a picture of selfhood complete enough to
encompass the ways in which selfhood is conceived and represented
outside of the philosophy of mind. Anti-Cartesian thinkers do themselves
a disservice by presenting intersubjectivity and Cartesianism as
incompatible. Indeed, the project of separating the two models is
somewhat at odds with the spirit of intersubjectivity: by bringing the
models together, by finding consensus, the philosophy of mind might be
enriched.
The “problem” of self is that it appears to be “paradoxically, both
autonomous and interdependent” (Tsekeris, 2015, p. 1). However, this
supposed “paradox” stems from stripping away some aspects of self while
overemphasising others. Some degree of independence is necessary in
order to maintain that humans are capable of autonomy, of making
self-directed intentional choices, and of taking moral responsibility for
those choices, for instance. Functional sociality is based on these
presuppositions, which balance independence (responsibility for one’s
actions) with other-oriented considerations (responsibility to not harm
others via one’s actions, for example). Sociality is a normal aspect of
human existence: social relations are often complex, but the idea that
sociality causes ontological paradoxes is peculiar to a philosophical mode
of interpreting human existence. As Turner et al. have it, “group
relationships exist socially and psychologically and therefore it is
necessary […] to define oneself in [those] terms” (1994, p. 460).
Furthermore, entities and objects are routinely conceived of as
occupying two seemingly distinct roles simultaneously without
contradiction. A hand can be perceived as a meaningfully distinct
object, but it is also usually part of a larger whole (a body), and the two
are not mutually exclusive. So it is with intersubjectivity; a person can be
identified as an individual and as part of a grouping such as a family
concurrently. This involves accounting for the relations between an
individual and the larger structures involved: there is no paradox. The way
one perceives, interprets, and engages with the individual might alter in
various relational contexts (since a particular context reveals specific
characteristics or traits), but that perspectival shift does not change the
individual themselves. In fact, one’s understanding of the individual is
augmented by recognising the relational contexts the individual belongs
to, and acknowledging the multitude of characteristics that are highlighted
as being significant in differing relational contexts.
Although Paranormal Activity does not offer a theory of selfhood per se,
it does present an inductive analogical argument in support of consensus
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between the two paradigms. The films capture core elements of both the
Cartesian and intersubjective models of self. The series also provides a
further feature: via the films’ formal and narrative structures, the series
brings those two paradigms together within a coherent whole. The two
models emphasise different aspects of the texts and selfhood, but they are
not incompatible; they co-exist. Paranormal Activity thus demonstrates
that it is plausible to bring these two models together in a cohesive way.
Rather than presenting intersubjectivity as incompatible with Cartesian
thinking, it would be productive to find ways to retain the pertinent
aspects of both views, and to unify them. Such theories may already exist
in embryo. Recall that some thinkers accidentally incorporate Cartesian
premises into their supposedly anti-Cartesian models. The flaw here arises
only from the quest to design an anti-Cartesian model; if the aim were to
generate an integrated paradigm, these extant theoretical arguments might
instead be considered successes.
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